Uncovering Security Vulnerabilities in Real-world Implementation and Deployment of 5G Messaging Services
May 27, 2024·
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0 min read
Yaru Yang
Yiming Zhang
Tao Wan
Chuhan Wang
Haixin Duan
Jianjun Chen
Yishen Li
Abstract
5G messaging services, based on Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA) Rich Communication Service (RCS) and 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), have been deployed globally by more than 90 mobile operators serving over 421 million monthly active users via 1.2 billion devices. Despite the widespread use, security research of 5G messaging remains sparse. In this paper, we present a comprehensive security analysis and measurement of 5G messaging services, assisted by a semi-automated testing tool we developed. We considered both carrier-side deployment and phone-side software implementations by testing against three large operators, each with hundreds of millions of subscribers, and six popular 5G messaging-enabled devices. We uncovered 4 categories of vulnerabilities, allowing for a wide range of attacks, including Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, zero-click remote information leakage, phone storage exhaustion and mobile data consumption, and Denial-of-Services (DoS) attacks. Our study underscores the need for further security enhancements in security specifications, implementation, and deployment of 5G messaging services.
Type
Publication
Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec ‘24)

Authors
Yaru Yang is a PhD student at Tsinghua University, majoring in Cyberspace Security. His research focuses on cellular network security, including IMS security, femtocell security, and core network security. His work has been published or accepted at leading academic conferences such as NDSS, IEEE S&P, DSN, and WiSec. He is also a CTF player and the former captain of Team Redbud, focusing on pwn, reverse, and misc challenges. He has won awards at competitions such as GeekPwn, GeekCon, WACON, and XCTF.
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